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61 
Twilight of the International Consensus:  
How Multinationals Squandered  
Their Tax Privileges
*
 
Lee A. Sheppard 
In September 2013, Exxon Mobil Corp. announced it would 
recognize gay marriage for its employees.
1
 This was front-page news, 
right up there with a New Jersey Supreme Court judge telling the 
state it had to do the same.
2
 Why? Because Exxon is a politically 
conservative oil company that makes most of its political donations to 
Republicans? No, because Exxon is such a huge non-state actor that 
anything it does is tantamount to a government action.  
In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills cogently explained how giant 
multinational corporations had escaped the writ of national 
governments.
3
 Exxon is one of the world’s ten largest multinational 
corporate groups measured by market value.
4
 At the time of this 
writing, nine companies on that list were American, along with 
around half of the fifty.
5
 Some of the world’s largest companies pay 
very little tax anywhere in the world. But to their home governments, 
they are often national champions. 
Some other countries’ multinationals are unfairly skipping-out on 
their corporate tax obligations to Organization for Economic 
 
 * A version of this Essay was previously published as Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: 
The Twilight of the International Consensus, 72 TAX NOTES INT’L 7 (Oct. 7, 2013). 
 1. Jonathan Fahey, Exxon to Offer Benefits to Same-Sex Couples in US, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Sept. 27, 2013, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/exxon-offer-benefits-same-sex-
couples-us. 
 2.  Kate Zernick, Judge Orders New Jersey to Allow Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/nyregion/new-jersey-judge-
rules-state-must-allow-gay-marriage.html. 
 3. See generally CHARLES WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956). 
 4. The World’s Biggest Firms: Back on Top, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2013, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586558-american-private-enterprise-dominates-
corporate-premier-league-again-thanks-waning.  
 5. Id. 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) member and observer 
countries.
6
 That was the genesis of the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting project (BEPS),
7
 which has produced an action plan 
designed to repair and preserve the fragile international consensus in 
the short run, but may end up upsetting it in the long run.
8
 In the long 
run, the international consensus is dead, and everyone knows it; but 
BEPS has to be tried and allowed to fail first. 
What is the international consensus? It is a century-old, mostly 
European gentlemen’s agreement to give residence countries tax 
jurisdiction over income earned by their residents in source 
countries.
9
 Legally, the source country has the superior right to tax 
income earned within its borders, so the consensus requires countries 
to agree to be deprived of tax jurisdiction.
10
 
This consensus was intended to permit multinationals to do 
business in treaty countries while paying tax only on income earned 
locally through separate entities and permanent establishments.
11
 This 
limitation of tax jurisdiction is key to the OECD model treaty.
12
 
Of course, multinationals are vertically integrated and don’t 
transact with their affiliates at market prices. So an economic 
philosophy—which appears nowhere in the OECD model treaty—
that multinationals should transact with their affiliates at hypothetical 
arm’s-length market prices was grafted-on later.13 
It has been an open secret for some time that multinationals—led 
by the Americans and their huge tax departments—have abused these 
 
 6. See Members and Partners, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
membersandpartners/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 7. See About BEPS, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-
about.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
 8. ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION & PROFIT SHIFTING 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter OECD ACTION PLAN]. 
 9. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: OECD Tries to Fix Income Shifting, 138 TAX 
NOTES 782 (Feb. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Income Shifting]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Permanent establishment is a deliberate limitation on tax jurisdiction.  
 12. See OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME & ON 
CAPITAL (2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation 
/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_9789264175181-en#page1 [hereinafter 
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION]. 
 13. Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX 
NOTES 625 (1986).  
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privileges. The affected countries are no longer limited to corrupt, 
badly governed, resource-exporting countries. They now include 
European states with sophisticated tax administrations and the home 
governments of multinationals. Every country is just another country 
to be exploited. And the multinational actors are larger and more 
powerful than some of the affected governments. So the BEPS 
project can be seen in some ways as a way for governments to regain 
control of their corporate tax bases and of multinationals in general. 
Corporate income taxes account for a tiny proportion of total 
revenues in the United States and Europe.
14
 
At the Washington University School of Law symposium, some 
speakers worried about the lack of consensus and the chaotic results 
that could flow from it. The title of the symposium, “Conceptualizing 
a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation,” reflected 
this concern. But a new consensus cannot be built until the old one 
dies, weakened by impossibility of administration. 
In the short run, U.S. multinationals will pay some more tax to 
some foreign governments, but not the U.S. government. In the long 
run, we already know what the outcome will be—apportionment of 
multinationals’ profits based on sales.  
But we are years away from a new worldwide consensus on any 
kind of apportionment—which would be a practical, not 
philosophical, solution. The United States and Europe still think they 
run the world, and residence country prerogative will not be 
surrendered easily. Europe has a formulary apportionment project, 
the common consolidated corporate tax base, waiting in the wings.
15
 
The old order has to fail completely first. It is not failing quickly 
enough for some tastes. The international consensus was always 
fragile, and always required agreement of the players. OECD 
member countries, in true European fashion, often pushed subjects of 
disagreement under the rug. The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, as guardian of the OECD model treaty, has been 
 
 14. See, e.g., TAX. TRENDS IN THE EUR. UNION 189, 190 (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysi
s/tax_structures/2013/report.pdf.  
 15. See generally Commission Proposal for a Directive of the Council on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, at 21, COM (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation 
_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/com_2011_121_en.pdf. 
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identified as the enabler of multinational tax avoidance.
16
 So the 
BEPS project sees the OECD trying to reclaim relevance. 
The United States and its overbanked crony, the United Kingdom, 
used the OECD as a vehicle to push their agendas.
17
 European 
countries that genuinely believed in multilateral solutions began the 
BEPS project—but they have European institutions like the European 
Commission as an alternative.
18
 Taken together, both sets of countries 
need the OECD to remain relevant for different reasons. 
The OECD needs India and China—which, despite being 
observers, are equal partners in the BEPS process—because their 
economies are too big and too important to the functioning of 
Western multinationals to ignore. The BEPS project is an attempt to 
get these countries back on the reservation.
19
 If these countries are 
not happy with the results, they will continue to take creative license 
with the OECD model treaties they signed.
20
 The likelihood is that 
they will be dissatisfied, they will continue to audit aggressively, and 
they will continue to undermine international consensus from within. 
The OECD is at work drafting the BEPS action plan 
recommendations, which are narrowly targeted to a few specific 
behaviors of mostly American multinationals.
21
 The main objects of 
concern are companies that have intellectual property at the center of 
operations and have managed to shift the excess profits from the 
intellectual property to havens. Apple—the world’s largest company 
by market value—is an example of that behavior.22 Most of these 
behaviors are legal or tolerated under U.S. law and, in the view of 
their proponents, should go unchallenged by the affected countries.
23
  
 
 16. OECD admitted as much. ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION & 
PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/ 
addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en [hereinafter OECD ADDRESSING 
BASE EROSION]. 
 17. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Is Transfer Pricing Worth Salvaging?, 136 TAX 
NOTES 467 (July 30, 2012) [hereinafter Sheppard, Transfer Pricing]. 
 18. See id. 
 19. These countries are participating in the base erosion project as full members, even 
though they have only observer status at the OECD. 
 20. See Sheppard, Transfer Pricing, supra note 17. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Lee A. Sheppard, Apple’s Tax Magic, 138 TAX NOTES 967 (2013). 
 23. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: How Can Vulnerable Countries Cope with Tax 
Avoidance?, 138 TAX NOTES 409 (Jan. 28, 2013).  
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The other main objection is specific tax planning to shift income 
out of European market countries through intragroup payments for 
interest, commissions, and the like, which goes under the euphemism 
supply chain restructuring.
24
 All multinationals employ these tricks—
many of which should never have been tolerated in the first place. 
This problem requires adjustments to domestic law, and the 
Europeans are looking to the OECD for guidance about best 
practices, despite the idiosyncrasies of their own laws. 
Exxon would hardly be touched, except by the action plan’s call 
for country-by-country reporting of income—a concept that 
originated in attempts to keep resource extraction companies honest 
and is already in place for those companies under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
25
  
Banks would not be touched, despite their size, worldwide 
connections, and continuing propensity to lead the world economy 
over the cliff. But it was the bank-engineered financial meltdown that 
prompted strapped European governments to start looking for more 
tax revenue. Only the U.S. government, which has its own currency, 
the petrodollar, has failed to ramp up tax enforcement in the wake of 
the meltdown.
26
 In the good times, no one cares whether rich people 
and big companies don’t pay tax. Budget numbers—not some grand 
philosophy about fairness—motivated the G-20 to endorse the BEPS 
project. 
SPECIFIC IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS 
At the Washington University symposium, much of the discussion 
concerned multinational tax avoidance tactics. The trouble is, most of 
these tactics are enabled by separate company accounting, which is 
enshrined in European agreements made in the wake of World 
War I.
27
 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2013). 
 26. United States tax enforcement does not adjust to revenue needs.  
 27. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. By treating each legal entity in a multinational corporate group as formally distinct, the tax 
law must attempt to recreate arm’s-length prices for transactions between them, 
notwithstanding that the entities are related and all part of a single economic unit.  
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Separate company accounting has not been identified as a problem 
by the OECD. Eventually, the artificial separateness of legal entities 
will have to be ignored, as will many of their transactions with 
affiliates. Until then, the symptoms of the problem will be addressed 
piecemeal. The BEPS action plan can be read as a series of patches 
on separate company accounting and transfer pricing.
28
 
The abuses to which the BEPS project is addressed typically take 
the form of intangibles holding companies
29
 in havens and supply 
chain restructuring in which a buy-sell distributor’s sales income is 
reduced to a commission.
30
 When a multinational can move its 
intellectual property, these tactics are used in combination. So the 
normal income from selling patent-protected goods wholesale is 
broken up into several streams of income, large chunks of which are 
hived off to havens.
31
 
How could valuable intangibles be so easily moved to havens 
without some sort of toll charge along the way? American 
multinationals moved a lot when U.S. cost-sharing rules had no 
restrictions.
32
 Now that the rules have been amended to require 
participation by the tax haven recipient of the transfer, companies 
transfer inchoate ideas that ripen into hugely valuable intangibles 
under haven ownership.
33
 
The OECD had previously blessed restructuring as business-
motivated.
34
 But the OECD changed tack when it described some 
 
 28. See Sheppard, Transfer Princing, supra note 17. See also Lee Sheppard, Transfer 
Pricing as Tax Avoidance, FORBES, June 26, 2010, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
2010/06/24/tax-finance-multinational-economics-opinions-columnists-lee-sheppard.html. 
 29. See A Brief History and Update of Intangible Holding Companies, ALVAREZ & 
MARSAL HOLDINGS, LLC (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/brief-history-
and-update-intangible-holding-companies-1. 
 30. See OECD ADDRESSING BASE EROSION, supra note 16. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Methods to Determine Taxable Income in Connection with a Cost Sharing 
Arrangement, 26 C.F.R. § 1.482–7. 
 33. Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297 (2009), nonacq. action on dec., 
2010-05 (Nov. 10, 2010). 
 34. See ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINAT’L 
ENTERS. & TAX ADMINS. (1995), available at www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-
pricing-guidelines.htm. 
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typical restructuring arrangements in its February 2013 report, 
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.
35
 
Buy-sell distributors located in European market countries are 
contractually converted to commissionnaires and other stripped-risk 
distributors, confined to taking orders and negotiating prices.
36
 But 
nothing changes in the former distributor’s relationship with the 
customers—who are often explicitly told that nothing has changed.37 
The remainder of what would have been the typical selling 
margin, taxable in the country of sale, could be paid as deductible 
royalties to an intangibles holding company in a haven and as product 
purchase to a principal company in another haven. The product may 
be made by a related contract manufacturer whose compensation is 
limited to cost plus markup. After the conversion, the principal 
company owns all of the product (or materials, in the case of contract 
manufacturing) and indemnifies the commissionnaire against risks.
38
 
These structures have been challenged by tax authorities arguing 
that the former distributor should earn more of the sales income.
39
 
Multinationals have successfully deflected challenges by pointing to 
contractual limitations and continental commissionnaire statutes.
40
 
They won their cases under domestic law, saying that 
commissionnaires cannot bind their principals.
41
 But the taxpayer lost 
when the courts looked at the totality of the circumstances.
42
  
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
How is it possible to knock out the use of commissionnaires and 
other stripped-risk distributors without opening up the touchy subject 
of agency permanent establishment (PE)? It might not be possible to 
 
 35. OECD ADDRESSING BASE EROSION, supra note 16.  
 36. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Brave New World of the Dependent Agent 
PE, 140 TAX NOTES 7 (July 1, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Brave New World]. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Cour de cassation [cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Mar. 31, 2010, D.P. 111, 
Nos. 304715, 308525 (Fr.) (Société Zimmer Ltd.); Rt. 2011, HR-2-11-2245-a (Nor.) (Dell 
Products (NUF) v. Tax East). 
 42. S.T.S., Jan. 12, 2012 (No. 1626/2008) (Spain) (Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd.). 
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achieve that result in a clean or lasting fashion without addressing 
PE. The OECD plans to draft a treaty provision to prevent avoidance 
of agency PE status by commissionnaires and other stripped-risk 
distributors, and then to work on profit attribution.
43
 That could be 
messy if the criteria for agency PE remain untouched. The BEPS 
drafters might have to suggest factual inquiries into whether the 
former distributor behaved according to the new documents. Or they 
might have to allow tax administrators to ignore the documents in 
some circumstances. Restructuring plans are often badly 
implemented because it is inconvenient to require the principal 
company to separately approve every sale. 
To its proponents, the point of the narrow PE standard is to 
prevent a foreign corporation from being subject to taxation when it 
is merely selling in another country.
44
 But the badly drafted agency 
PE provisions of the OECD model treaty have been abused and are 
sorely in need of a rewrite.
45
  
PE is the biggest subject that the BEPS project will take on—
reluctantly. The narrow concept of PE is at the heart of the 
international consensus that protects multinationals from excessive 
or, in many cases, meaningful taxation. The Americans don’t want to 
take on PE.
46
 The Germans don’t want to take on PE.47 The French 
don’t want to take on PE—but they want some American companies 
to pay tax in France.
48
 The Indians have been quietly expanding PE 
for years and will continue to do so.
49
 
The Americans want to protect their national champions, just like 
the Germans want to protect theirs. All multinationals that sell 
complicated products, be they digital or physical, run the risk of 
creating a PE in a purchaser country when they send personnel in to 
 
 43. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 32, Annex A. 
 44. Sheppard, Brave New World, supra note 36. 
 45. Id. 
 46. The Americans are also highly resistant to the idea that digital economy companies 
should be separately defined for purposes of taxation. 
 47. See Sheppard, Brave New World, supra note 36. 
 48. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Offshored Intangibles and the OECD Base 
Erosion Project, 139 TAX NOTES 367 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 49. India’s treaties and audit practices demonstrate an expansive view of tax jurisdiction 
over nonresident businesses doing business there. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Picking 
Apart the OECD BEPS Action Plan, 140 TAX NOTES 965 (Sept. 2, 2013). 
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help with the product, or even when they help the customer from 
outside the country.
50
 So it is important for the Americans and the 
Germans to prevent the whole PE subject from being opened up. 
Google is the object of French ire. The French believe there 
should be some way to tax value added when Google scoops up local 
customer information and resells it to advertisers.
51
 The argument is 
that digital commerce should be taxed in the country of residence of 
the customer, because the product is transformed when the customer 
uses it.
52
 The French are not wrong in this view, but the OECD hasn’t 
philosophically come around to the idea of economic nexus for 
remote actors.
53
  
The French are talking about a byte tax as a way of getting some 
non-income tax jurisdiction over digital economy companies having 
no physical presence there.
54
 The conundrum for France is that it 
would like to assert jurisdiction over Google and its digital economy 
brethren without subjecting French national champions to tax when a 
Chinese woman buys a handbag.
55
 France is home to some large and 
adventurous multinationals. The byte tax would be the perfect 
solution.
56
 
A conversation about Google is necessarily a conversation about 
nonphysical PE, which also goes under the moniker service PE.
57
 
Only the Indians and other countries with service PE in their treaties 
want to have that conversation. Having that conversation is 
inevitable. The BEPS project is an exercise in deferring the inevitable 
on a number of counts. 
The trouble is that the Americans don’t appear to want Google to 
be paying byte taxes or income taxes to other countries. Most of the 
 
 50. See Nicolas Colin, Corporate Tax 2.0: Why France and the World Need a New Tax 
System for the Digital Age, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/singularity/2013/01/28/corporate-tax-2-0-why-france-and-the-world-need-a-new-tax-system-
for-the-digital-age/.  
 51. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Digital Economy and Permanent 
Establishment, 139 TAX NOTES 364 (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Digital Economy]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Colin, supra note 50. 
 55. See Sheppard, Digital Economy, supra note 51.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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big digital players are American, and few of them pay tax anywhere, 
including the United States.
58
 So the United States successfully 
deferred discussion of digital economy tax jurisdiction by getting the 
others to agree to a study.
59
 In American practice, a study is a way to 
bury a problem. 
Will the United States tax these digital companies if it succeeds in 
preventing the Europeans from taxing them? No, and the same is true 
of all U.S.-based multinationals. The current congressional plan 
appears to be a conversion to a territorial system with a complicated 
minimum tax to take some of the juice out of income shifting to tax 
havens.
60
 Nothing in that plan would significantly increase corporate 
tax revenues or correct structural problems in the U.S. system, but it 
would make some people feel better. 
Starbucks doesn’t have a complicated business model, but it 
doesn’t pay much tax, either. It uses a Swiss principal company to 
buy green coffee beans for the group, which sells them at a high 
markup to another company that roasts them, which in turn sells the 
roasted beans to retailers. That a coffee brewer that doesn’t depend 
on unique intangibles or complicated industrial processes should so 
readily be able to beat its tax bill in countries where it has huge 
markets is an indictment of the OECD model treaty and the 
international consensus.  
DOMESTIC LAW CHANGES 
I have often used the tort law concept of attractive nuisance to 
describe features of European tax law that are ripe for abuse by 
multinationals.
61
 Contributory negligence should also be invoked. 
Some of these features are so obviously in need of correction that the 
affected governments could be said to have contributed to the black 
 
 58. Every country has its national champions. 
 59. See Lee A. Sheppard, Hints About the OECD BEPS Action Plan, 140 TAX NOTES 22 
(July 1, 2013). 
 60. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Globalization and International Tax Rules, 139 TAX 
NOTES 587 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: OECD BEPS Action Plan: Trying to Save 
the System, 140 TAX NOTES 283 (July 22, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Trying to Save the 
System]. 
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holes in their budgets. Happily, these problems are easy to correct, 
with the OECD providing guidance and, more importantly, political 
cover for lawmakers. 
Controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules essentially ignore the 
separation of CFCs in certain circumstances to tax their income to 
their domestic parents.
62
 The BEPS project aims to recommend best 
practices for strengthening them—assuming the participating 
countries can agree on the purpose of these rules. 
No amount of advice, however, will overcome the high bar for 
artificiality of companies set by the European Court of Justice.
63
 
Essentially, European companies can shift income around Europe at 
will, as long as the purported earners have phones and desks and 
employees. CFC rules operate on the presumption of tax avoidance, 
and the Cadbury Schweppes decision of the European Court of 
Justice effectively prohibits this presumption.
64
 
The Europeans think requiring substance in CFCs will solve the 
problem. It will not. Requiring substance will mean income shifting 
is more expensive, and requires more bodies to be thrown at tax 
avoidance plans; but when billions of dollars are at stake, a few boots 
on the ground in a pleasant European tax haven becomes a bearable 
cost. And the result may still be objectionable to the multinational’s 
home country. 
The British have effectively repealed their CFC rules, albeit in a 
complicated way that requires expensive guidance from tax 
professionals.
65
 So they are sensitive to implied demands that every 
OECD member strengthen these rules.
66
  
The U.S. CFC rules have been effectively repealed 
administratively by the check-the-box rules, which permit elective 
inconsistent treatment or even non-recognition of entities for tax 
 
 62. CFC rules generally tax the parent company of a foreign subsidiary for certain passive 
income earned by the subsidiary and not distributed to the parent. See, e.g., 26 USC § 951(a). 
 63. See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, Ltd. v. Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-7997. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See Finance Act, 2012, § 180, sch. 20 (Eng.), available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2012/14/pdfs/ukpga_20120014_en.pdf. 
 66. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Rosbif Rules: What Should the OECD Do About 
Base Erosion?, 140 TAX NOTES 1055 (2013). 
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purposes.
67
 These rules have been called the single stupidest 
administrative gesture in the history of the income tax.
68
 It remains to 
be seen whether Congress will see fit to strengthen the CFC rules as 
it contemplates lowering corporate rates.
69
 
The check-the-box rules have caused damage all over the world, 
and U.S. companies benefit the most from them. Hybrid entities
70
 
have enabled multinationals to beat CFC rules and arbitrage different 
tax systems. Hybrids are a huge problem that is relatively easy to fix 
with rules like Denmark’s, which treat a hybrid entity the way it is 
treated in its home country.
71
 The OECD is contemplating a 
tiebreaker rule for entity classification.
72
 
European laws also enable hybrid transactions and securities, like 
repos and debt/equity hybrids.
73
 There is no excuse for leaving laws 
in place that enable this kind of arbitrage. The trouble is that civil law 
is highly formal.  
Not to be outdone by the OECD, the European Commission 
recently proposed an amendment to the EU parent-subsidiary 
directive (2011/96/EU), which excuses dividends from taxation when 
paid to a parent company. The proposed amendment would deny 
exemption when the payer deducted the payment.
74
 The trouble is 
that many EU countries have separate, broadly applicable 
participation exemptions in domestic law.
75
 The action plan states 
 
 67. Classification of Certain Business Entities, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (2013). 
 68. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Defending the Obama International Proposals, 
123 TAX NOTES 1391 (2009) [hereinafter Sheppard, Defending the Obama International 
Proposals]. 
 69. Jamie Arora & Matthew R. Madara, Ways and Means Considers Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, TAX ANALYSTS (June 24, 2013), available at www.taxanalysts.com/www/ 
features.nsf/Articles/61C07CBCD545C07A85257B94005CC5EA?OpenDocument. 
 70. Hybrid entities are those entities treated as a corporate taxpayer in one country and as 
fiscally transparent in another See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of 
International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555 (2006).  
 71. See Ole Steen Schmidt, The Scope of the New Danish Anti-Check-the-Box 
Regulations, 55 TAX NOTES INT’L 939 (2009). 
 72. See Sheppard, Trying to Save the System, supra note 61. 
 73. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Things We Never Said About Debt, Equity, and 
Hybrids, 137 TAX NOTES 230 (2012). 
 74. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the 
Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of 
Different Member States, COM (2013) 814 final (Nov. 25, 2013).  
 75. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Location, Location, Location for Minimizing 
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that the OECD will develop model domestic law provisions that deny 
a deduction, deny an exemption, or deny a double deduction.
76
 
Interest deductions are a widely and easily abused form of 
intragroup payment. The BEPS action plan hints that the OECD may 
propose a model domestic law that denies a deduction for related-
party interest that is not taxed to the recipient.
77
 European countries 
are already moving toward the German approach of restricting 
interest deductions to 30 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, 
and depreciation.
78
 The German rules have loopholes, particularly for 
companies with no external debt, so some adjustment is required. 
Section 163(j),
79
 the U.S. limitation rule for interest deductions, 
was intended to discriminate against Europeans.
80
 It is toothless, and 
occasional attempts to fix it have been successfully rebuffed by 
foreign company lobbying. But the United States does have a rational 
method for allocation of interest expenses.
81
 At the OECD, a 
consensus appears to be forming around a version of the British 
worldwide debt cap, which prevents British interest deductions from 
exceeding the group’s net external interest expense.82 
TREATY CHANGES 
Anti-abuse rules are also on the BEPS agenda. Recently, there has 
been considerable debate about whether it is even possible to abuse a 
treaty.
83
 In most European countries, a treaty trumps national law, 
and taxpayers are entitled to rely on the literal language of the 
treaty.
84
 In the United States, taxpayers are allowed to choose 
 
Taxes, 102 TAX NOTES 1592 (2004). 
 76. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 30, Annex A. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Fashion in Interest Deduction 
Restrictions, 133 TAX NOTES 1061 (2011). See also Abgabenordnung [AO] [Fiscal Code], Oct. 
1, 2002, BGBL. I at 3866, as amended, § 8A (Ger.). 
 79. 26 U.S.C.S. § 163(j) (2014). 
 80. Square D Co. v. Comm’r, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 81. Determination of Interest Deductions, 26 C.F.R. § 1.882-5 (2013). 
 82. Sheppard, Defending the Obama International Proposals, supra note 68. 
 83. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Beyond Nondiscrimination—Should the ECJ Do 
More?, 62 TAX NOTES INT’L 927 (2011). 
 84. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Treaty Countries’ Right to Use Domestic Law, 
137 TAX NOTES 347 (Oct. 22, 2012). 
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between the treaty and national law.
85
 Congress frequently overrides 
treaties.
86
 
But the OECD accepts that treaties can be abused.
87
 The OECD 
will draft an anti-abuse provision for treaties. In this context, abuse 
refers to the use of third countries to gain unwarranted treaty benefits. 
The provision will clarify that treaties are not meant to facilitate 
double non-taxation—something the OECD has never done before in 
its great service to multinationals.
88
 
The best way to address this problem is to put a subject-to-tax 
clause in a treaty or in domestic law. Sadly, the OECD appears 
headed in the direction of the American limitation on benefits 
clauses, which, in their more complicated versions, do not restrain 
public companies.
89
  
The Germans have figured out how to do it better. German 
domestic law denies exemption when a German resident’s foreign 
income is not effectively taxed in the partner country.
90
 This rule is 
reiterated in some recent German treaties (which take precedence 
over domestic law).
91
 Under Germany’s recently negotiated treaties 
with Hungary and Luxembourg, dividends received would not be 
exempt in Germany if they are deductible by the payer.
92
 Moreover, 
the residence clause of those treaties requires that an entity be 
resident by virtue of being liable to tax on all income.
93
  
The OECD has also announced a mechanism to amend OECD 
model treaties by mutual agreement, so a couple thousand treaties do 
 
 85. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 86. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 894 (1997). 
 87. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 18. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Model Income Tax Convention, U.S., art. 22, Nov. 15, 2006, available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model00 .pdf . 
 90. Aussensteuergesetz [AStG] [Law on External Tax Relations], 1972, BGBL. I at § 8 
(Ger.). 
 91. See Sheppard, Defending the Obama International Proposals, supra note 68.  
 92. Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Grossherzogtum 
Luxemburg zur Vermeidung der Dobbelbesteuereng und Verhinderung der Steuerhinterziehung 
au dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und vom Vermogen [Agreement Between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion], Apr. 23, 2012, BGBL. II at art. 22, § 1(a). 
 93.  Id. at art. 4, § 1. See also Eugen Bogenschutz & Jean Schaffner, The New Germany-
Luxembourg Income Tax Treaty, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 255 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  Twilight of the International Consensus 75 
 
 
not have to be arduously renegotiated. The OECD proposes to make 
existing bilateral OECD model treaties ambulatory by creating a 
multilateral treaty amendment.
94
 Signatories will automatically accept 
amendments and treaty interpretations contained in the document for 
their in-force treaties.
95
 
This is a procedural thing, but it’s huge. Essentially, the OECD 
model treaty itself is a highly inefficient form of multilateral 
agreement. Making the treaty function like the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association master swaps agreement
96
 would be a 
great improvement. It would also enhance the OECD’s credibility, 
which has suffered from an unworkable redrafting of Article 7, the 
business profits article.
97
 
The presence of European havens, many of which are European 
Union members, throws a spanner in the BEPS works. The OECD 
doesn’t have a good answer to this problem, but the action plan 
identified corporate rate reductions and preferential regimes (such as 
patent boxes) as harmful.
98
 The OECD backed off its previous 
assertion that countries must compete on corporate income tax rates 
to gain the favor of multinationals.
99
 Businesses compete with each 
other. Countries do not compete. 
The United Kingdom wants its banking haven to be a tax haven—
or at least to prevent British companies from headquartering next 
door in Ireland or offshoring their intellectual property.
100
 Ireland is a 
tax haven and an EU member.
101
 The Netherlands is a tax haven and 
 
 94. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 24. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The ISDA Master Form Agreement is a form published by the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association that is used by parties to facilitate entering into financial derivative 
transactions, and any changes made to the master agreement have immediate effect. See Lee A. 
Sheppard, U.S. Sells Europeans on FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements, 136 TAX NOTES 
1504 (Sept. 24, 2012). 
 97. See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 12. No country has incorporated the 
new Article 7 in a treaty. 
 98. OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 17. 
 99. OECD ADDRESSING BASE EROSION, supra note 16, at 30–32. 
 100. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: FATCA Arbitrage Through London, 140 TAX 
NOTES 854 (Aug. 26, 2013). 
 101. See Sheppard, Income Shifting, supra note 9. Ireland promised to change its residence 
rules so that Irish-incorporated entities are treated as Irish residents, unless they can only be 
treated as resident in a treaty country by reason of being managed and controlled there. Finance 
Bill (No. 2/2013) (Ir.), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2013/ 
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an EU member.
102
 Luxembourg is a tax haven and an EU member.
103
 
Switzerland is a tax haven, but not an EU member, and is currently 
distracted by U.S. ire over its banking practices.
104
 None of these 
countries have effective CFC rules.
105
 
These little enablers of multinational tax avoidance are very 
protective of their dubious international role and their corporate 
customers. The BEPS action plan calls for requiring the enablers to 
be transparent about the deals they cut with multinationals.
106
 Of 
course, the United States cuts deals with multinationals approving 
their transfer prices.
107
 These deals, called advance pricing 
agreements, are an admission that transfer pricing cannot be 
enforced. Multinationals, nearly all of which are publicly traded, can 
be expected to argue that some amorphous concept of corporate 
privacy should prevent disclosure of these grubby deals. 
INTANGIBLES 
The OECD wants to define the concept of intangibles broadly, 
with the aim of discouraging transfers to tax havens while continuing 
to recognize self-serving contracts between multinational affiliates.
108
 
The idea is that legal ownership would be subsumed in a set of 
factors gauging whether the tax haven entity participated in the 
 
10213/b10213d.pdf. This bill is addressed to Apple’s claim that its Irish subsidiary’s income 
cannot be taxable anywhere. 
 102. See Sheppard, Income Shifting, supra note 9. By decree, the Dutch Parliament has 
reiterated meaningless requirements for minimum substance for Dutch intermediary companies 
that collect interest and royalties for advance ruling purposes. The requirements include local 
board members, Dutch books and bank accounts, and Dutch management decisions.  
 103. See id. Luxembourg will end bank secrecy for individuals. This can be read as a move 
to retain corporate and investment fund business.  
 104. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Swiss Behavioral 
Patterns, 135 TAX NOTES 7 (Apr. 2, 2012). 
 105. Ireland has no CFC rules whatsoever.  
 106. See, e.g., OECD ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 18. The European Commission has 
also reportedly begun investigating tax ruling practices in Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands for violation of the state aid article of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. See generally Lee A. Sheppard et al., OECD Official Defends BEPS Action 
Plan, 141 TAX NOTES 149 (2013). 
 107. Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-1 C.B. 278; Rev. Proc. 2008-31, 2008-1 C.B. 1133. 
 108. ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., REVISED DISCUSSION DRAFT ON TRANSFER PRICING 
ASPECTS OF INTANGIBLES (July 3, 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/revised-discussion-draft-intangibles.pdf. 
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development of the transferred intangible. The OECD wants to 
allocate excess returns to where value is created.
109
 
It is very important to multinationals that these contracts be 
respected, and the 1995 OECD transfer pricing guidelines call for 
them to be respected.
110
 Tax auditors in some countries are ignoring 
intangibles transfers that they believe cannot be properly priced, 
taking their inspiration from the BEPS action plan.
111
 The OECD 
party line remains that there is no transaction that cannot be priced, 
and that everything will fall into place when the correct price is 
assigned.  
These contracts are a real problem. Certainly, if affiliates do not 
behave according to contractual terms and payments are not made, 
contracts can be ignored. But proving that entails a trip to court on 
the part of the tax administrator, and well-advised multinationals do 
spend money to babysit their contracts. 
The problem with focusing on the transfer of the intangible, like 
focusing on substance in tax havens, is that it asks the wrong 
question. It assumes that the residence country of the parent of a 
multinational group—usually where the intangible was developed—
has a superior right to tax the excess returns from the intangible, and 
that the haven has no right to shelter them. It is a two-actor analysis. 
But the problem has three actors, as the discussion at Washington 
University demonstrated. The third and most important actor is the 
market country in which the intangible is exploited. Fairness 
demands that the market country get to tax some of the profits 
attributable to exploitation of the intangible. There is value creation 
when an intangible is exploited, in addition to when it is developed. 
Of course, the OECD model was designed to deprive these very 
countries of the right to tax income from all but local factories. But 
the OECD used the word “fair” in its February BEPS report.112 It is 
impossible to read anything into this statement, given the 
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determination of the participants to preserve the international 
consensus, but here it is: 
In an era where non-resident taxpayers can derive substantial 
profits from transactions with customers located in another 
country, questions are being raised as to whether the current 
rules ensure a fair allocation of taxing rights on business 
profits, especially where [sic] the profits from such 
transactions go untaxed anywhere.
113
 
 
 113. Id. 
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